South Sudan’s Fragile Peace Is Cracking at the Seams | Image Source: theconversation.com
JUBA, South Sudan, 7 April 2025 – A nation born of hope is once again agitated on the brink of collapse. South Sudan, the youngest country in the world, has been facing one of its most serious political and humanitarian crises since the end of its bloody civil war in 2018. With increasing violence, political repression and deep fractures within the unity government, the possibility of a return to civil war of all kinds is increasing every day.
How did South Sudan end up on the brink of war?
To understand the current tension, we must go back to the promises made – and broken – since the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Settlement of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in 2018. This agreement was hailed as a step forward after years of brutal conflict between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and those aligned with opposition leader Riek Machar. The agreement provided for a roadmap: a 36-month transition, a unified government, reformed institutions and, finally, democratic elections.
However, seven years later, most of these goals are still not met. Elections have been delayed several times, now pushed in December 2026, and many reforms, including in the military and judicial systems, are half or non-existent. According to independent investigations of 42 peace agreements in the civil war since 1989, South Sudan is distinguished by the extreme delays in the implementation and separation of the main signatories, including the house arrest of Machar, who remains under armed surveillance.
“The peace process in South Sudan has become a shell of its old promise,” said a regional analyst. “Beyond building towards democracy, it has become a tool for consolidating power by the dominant elite”
What caused the last wave of violence?
March 2025 marked a turning point. Tensions were ignored after government forces opposed the White Army militia in Upper Nile State, which led the militia to take control of the city of Nasir. Although the White Army was freely linked to the SPLM-IO because of ethnic ties, both mainly composed of the Nuer people, there is no conclusive evidence directly binding Machar to the militia’s actions.
Despite this, the government has reacted strongly. Air attacks against Nasir, civilian casualties and mass displacement have occurred. This escalation led to the house arrest of Machar and the arrest of several of his main allies, including Interior Minister Angelina Tady and the oil minister. SPLM-IO denounced these movements as a calculated attempt to dismantle the opposition and violate the terms of the peace agreement.
“These arrests are not about national security,” said a SPLM-IO spokesperson. “It’s about eliminating political rivals on the pretext of stability.”
Is the international community doing enough?
Diplomatic activity has increased over the past month. The delegations of the United Nations, the African Union, the East African Community and regional Governments, including Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, made mediation efforts. UNMISS, a United Nations peacekeeping mission, has increased patrols in internally displaced persons camps, where thousands of people seek refuge from further violence.
Police Commissioner Christine Fossen commented:,
“Given the current security situation, we recognize through our contacts with communities and internally displaced persons, who have concerns about their security and their future. »
But diplomatic efforts can be very little, too late. Observers argue that the previous approach of the international community has created a vacuum, allowing the Kiir government to manipulate the calendar and throw itself into the power of the opposition without fear of responsibility.
What are the main failures of the peace agreement?
The peace agreement was based on four pillars: security sector reform, institutional reform, transitional justice and the electoral process. All have seen limited progress.
- Security Sector Reform: The unified national army remains fractured. Instead of merging forces, Kiir’s allies have absorbed key SPLM-IO generals, further diluting opposition power.
- Transitional Justice: There is no functioning hybrid court to prosecute war crimes, and the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing exists mostly on paper.
- Constitutional and Electoral Reform: No national census has been completed, a prerequisite for elections. The drafting of a permanent constitution is similarly stalled.
- Disarmament and Reintegration: Many former fighters remain in limbo, increasing the risk of re-mobilization along ethnic lines.
Does the conflict become regional?
The war in Sudan introduced a dangerous external variable. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) reportedly recruited combatants from South Sudan. The country is also a crucial oil transit corridor for Sudan, which has a direct impact on the stability of South Sudan.
Kiir’s recent pivot to the United Arab Emirates, considered to be an important support from RSF, raises his eyebrows. After his visit to Abu Dhabi in February 2025, he dismissed the main security leaders aligned by the SAF and appointed businessman Benjamin Bol Mel as Vice-President. Bull Mel’s close ties with the authorities of the United Arab Emirates and the absence of political force suggest a movement to secure economic alliances rather than to unify the nation.
Who wins for destabilization?
The calculation for Kiir appears directly: the longer elections are delayed, more time must position a faithful successor and take control of the SPLM-IG. At the age of 73, their health was decreasing and speculations about succession were intensifying. Bol Mel, without a military or ethnic power base, is considered a sure bet, rather than challenging the status quo.
This succession plan explains the recent purges of opposition figures and state governors. Kiir gets rid of the political terrain for Bull Mel, potentially transforming the 2026 elections into horse races, or completely avoiding them.
Can peace be saved?
The situation is serious, but not irreversible. The experts argue that the success of peace processes requires sustained international participation, monitoring mechanisms and consequences for violations. The Tumaini Peace Initiative, launched by Kenya in 2024, aimed to broaden the participation of armed groups. But it was mined by not joining the initial 2018 agreement, which further complicates implementation.
To move forward, a number of measures are needed:
- International actors must demand strict adherence to the 2018 peace deal, making aid conditional on benchmarks.
- All political arrests must be reversed, and signatories reinstated in their original roles.
- A credible, independent mechanism to monitor peace implementation should be deployed immediately.
- Transitional justice mechanisms—particularly the hybrid court—must be activated without delay.
What is the future?
In the absence of urgent action, South Sudan faces the risk of a multifaceted political, ethnic and economic conflict. The ethnic tensions between the Dinka and the Nuer are already inflamed. With the deployment of special forces in Uganda and the war in the Sudan, the crisis could easily destabilize the entire region.
For the Sudanese people – many of whom are again displaced, hungry and scared – it is more than a political crisis. It was the collapse of a dream that began with independence in 2011. They endured war, hunger and false promises. Now they are asked to believe once again that peace is possible. If that confidence is rewarded, it will depend to a large extent on the willingness of world leaders to treat South Sudan not as a footnote, but as a priority.
The clock marks, and the world must decide: Will they live another nation to collapse, or will they finally intervene to prevent it?
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